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substitutes. The effects of a standard are shown to depend on the way the standard is specified,
which ftnn develops which product, and on the order in which products are discovered. Simple
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1. Introduction
International R&D competition often results in outcomes where several firms develop and
patent products that are close substitutes. In this situation, it is not uncommon for governments to
set anticipatory standards intended to improve the strategic (competitive) position of their firms. l
This paper examines the impact of such standards, and shows that in a dynamic, uncertain
environment, the use of simple, anticipatory standards is problematic. The welfare effects of a
standard are shown to depend on the way the standard is specified, but more importantly on which
fInn develops which product and on the order in which products are discovered. We show that
simple standards are, in general, time inconsistent. Even if a standard increases welfare after all
products are discovered, it still can reduce ex ante expected welfare because consumers are hurt
when products ruled out by a simple standard are discovered before the discovery of the product
set as the standard. Thus the only type of standard which can unambiguously increase welfare in a
dynamic, uncertain environment is one that is complicated in the sense that it is state-contingent.
Understanding the effects of product standards is important because the National
COqIpetitiveness Act of 1993 and various Congressional studies (U.S. Congress, 1988 and 1992)
recommend the use of standards to support U.S. industry in technology development. One
example of a standard is one requiring new products to be compatible with existing ones, such as
the Federal Communication Commission's regulation that HDTV transmission in the United States
either be receiver-compatible or allow simulcast with existing broadcasting channels. This
regulation meant that any non-compatible signal must fit into a 6-:MHzchannel and it was generally
considered to be a strategic move to improve the position of U.S. firms trying to develop HDTV,
because it meant the Japanese MUSE system could not be used in the U.S. without adaptation.
When the standard was announced (September 1988), the Japanese MUSE system was in working
prototype and its signal did not fit into 6-:MHz (Sims (1988». Zenith was developing a
IFor other aspects of standard setting and an excellent survey of needed research on the use
of standards in dynamic environments see David and Greenstein (1990).
2retrocompatible version, but it was only in the theoretical stage of development and was generally
considered to be inferior to the Japanese version. Hence, this regulation was, in effect, like a
standard based on the product being developed domestically. The move was considered strategic
because its announced intention was to alter the Japanese advantage in the race.
The United States is not alone in this type of standard setting. As is well documented by
Crane (1978), Europe never adopted a single color TV standard because individual governments
promoted standards to protect the interests of their fInns. Hazard and Daems (1988) and Pelkmans
and Beuter (1987) also make it clear that the European position on HDTV standards has the same
motivation.
This paper examines the impact of standards set for strategic reasons before products are
successfully developed. In order to examine such policies, it is imponant to model both the racing
aspect of international R&D competition and the simultaneous development of different products
by rival fInns. In Section 2, we present a model of uncenain R&D between a foreign and a
domestic firm where the foreign firm has an advantage in developing the superior of two closely
rela,ted products. Whether firms race for the same patent, pursue different patents simultaneously,
or the lagging firm drops out is determined endogenously in this model. In the absence of policy,
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) involves the foreign and domestic firm
simultaneously pursuing different patents if the foreign finn has a sufficiently large advantage. In
this model, dropping out is never subgame perfect in the absence of policy if pursuing an
alternative patent has positive expected return for the lagging finn.
In sections 3-5, we examine the impact of a national standard in one country. Two types of
standards are examined: (i) an ex ante commitment to one product as the standard throughout the
race and (ii) a state-contingent standard allowing adoption of a superior product as the standard
once it is discovered. As shown in Section 3, the simple standard increases the likelihood of both
firms racing for the product chosen as the standard. Thus, if the lagging finn is developing an \
inferior product, a standard set for its benefit may induce both finns to race for the inferior
product In Section 4, we show that such a policy in the lagging firm's home market need not be
3welfare improving ex ante even if it is certain to improve welfare ex post. This is because the
standard benefits the lagging (domestic) fIrm only after its R&D is successful, but consumer
choices are restricted once the foreign product is discovered. Hence, the simple standard can be
time inconsistent in the sense that expected welfare may increase or decrease during the race even if
it increases at the end of the race.2 Time consistency is shown to be a problem with a simple
standard, regardless of the product chosen or potential network benefits and regardless of the
impact on equilibrium strategies. The problem arises because of uncertain discovery and the fact
that consumer choices are restricted once the product ruled out by the standard is discovered.
The state-contingent standard considered in Section 5 avoids this problem because it
includes a contingency for the foreign product to be adopted once it is discovered The particular
policy considered benefits the lagging fIrm, as well as consumers, because it includes a
requirement that the foreign fIrm license its patent at a minimal fee.3 This policy is interesting in
several ways. First, in equilibrium the lagging firm may drop out of the race and wait to acquire a
license from the foreign firm. Second, the policy is shown to be time consistent whether or not the
lagging firm drops out. That is, when licensing occurs, domestic expected welfare is higher at
every date than it would be with no policy. Section 6 concludes.
Our work differs from the literature on compatibility standards in two important ways.
First, we examine the impact of a standard imposed before the successful completion of R&D.
Choi (1993, 1994), Farrell and Saloner (1985 and 1986a), and Katz and Shapiro (1986a and b)
examine the relation of compatibility and innovation, but they address issues related to adoption of
2If a standard is time inconsistent, the government will have an incentive to switch policies if
the product ruled out by the standard is discovered fIrst. Policy switches in such an uncertain
environment are not uncommon. An example in a different setting was the FCC reversal of its
decision on a color TV standard in the fifties once a superior system was developed. This
particular case involved a switch in the standard from the CBS system that was not retrocompatible
. to the NTSC retrocompatible system developed by other domestic firms. See Hazard and Daems
(1988).
3See Farrell and Shapiro (1992) on licensing requirements associated with standard setting of
IIDTV.
4exogenously developed technologies which are currently available. Second, we focus on
international competition. Shy (1991) and Kende (1991) examine compatibility in an international
context, but they also deal with currently available product innovations that are developed
exogenously. In Shy's analysis, markets are perfectly competitive and innovation takes the form
of consumers investing to improve the quality of existing products. Hence, his structure prevents
any analysis of how standards affect market competition or potential conflicts in the interests of
consumers and producers. As noted by Farrell and Shapiro (1992) in the case ofHDTV, these are
imponam aspects of standard setting in practice. Kende (1991) considers the effect of standards
on finn profits, but he examines de facIO standards created by licensing among firms within a
country.
Kende's analysis, as well as other international treatments of standards (Copeland (1992),
Crane (1979), Pelkmans & Beuter (1978), Hazard and Daems (1988), LeCraw (1987», have
discussed their trade inhibiting effects.4 In out analysis, the simple domestic standard has this
effect because it acts as a prohibitive quota. In contrast, the time-consistent contingent standard we
dev~lop does not inhibit trade and is Pareto improving compared to the simple standard. Since the
contingent standard involves compulsory licensing, our results provide a counterexample to the
prevailing wisdom that such licensing practices "may have adverse effects on trade. ,,5
Our work also differs from studies of patent races that have generally analyzed models in
which identical firms compete for the same patent (see Reinganum (1989) for an excellent survey).
One exception is the literature on sequences of races, in which firms compete for the same patent,
but are not identical because the winner of the preceding race earns greater profit during the current
race. Another exception is the literature on preemption and leapfrogging. Fudenberg, Gilbert,
Stiglitz, and Tiro1e (1983, hereafter FGST) analyze several related models in which one finn has
4For high enough network effects, foreign producers exit the domestic market in Kende's
model.
5This quote is from Anicle 40, Annex ill of GAIT (1991). Anicle 21 speaks against
compulsory licensing of trademarks.
5an advantage in a race for the same patent. In one of these modelS the firm behind drops out of the
race immediately (and the leader does R&D until discovery). In the others, the laggard will not
only stay in the race, but also may be able to leapfrog into the leadership role if the R&D process
involves two distinct stages with random discovery or if there is imperfect monitoring of the rival's
R&D effon. Lippman and McCardle (1987 and 1988) show that if the decision to do R&D is
made at discrete dates, the laggard drops out only if its rival has a large enough lead. Harris &
Vickers (1985) generalize these models by examining a race for a single patent in which a fum may
have a strategic advantage for a variety of reasons. This paper contributes to this literature by
showing a laggard will not drop out if it can develop a related, though inferior, patent.
Several of the issues we raise are addressed in the international trade literature. Dixit (1988
a and b), Bagwell and Staiger (1989), and Beath (1990) examine international R&D competition in
. the context of patent races. Although they allow asymmetries among fums, these studies consider
firms racing to develop the same product. Krishna (1988) and Yanagawa (1990) examine trade
policy in the presence of compatibility issues, but they neither examine the use of standards nor
explicitly consider R&D issues. Finally, Staiger and Tabellini (1987) examine the time consistency
of international trade policy, but they do not address R&D or standards issues.
2. A Model of Uncertain R&D With Substitutes
This section presents a model of uncertain R&D between a foreign and a domestic fum
where the foreign firm has an advantage in developing the superior of two closely related products.
In the absence of government policy, whether fums race for the same patent or simultaneously
conduct R&D on different products is shown to depend on relative returns of the products and the
foreign advantage in R&D. The existence of equilibria in which firms develop different products,
as well as the specification of one product as superior, are both important for the policy analysis.
Without the former, standards are irrelevant as a strategic policy tool. When both firms race to
develop the same product, any standard that restricts market access for the foreign fum does so for
the domestic firm as well. The latter is important because our interest is in national standards set to
6improve the relative position of the lagging firm in an international R&D race. As with Zenith's
Spectrum Compatible system and Japan Broadcasting's MUSE system, one way in which a firm
can be the "laggard" is for its version of the product is inferior to its rival's. Our specification
allows us to examine the welfare effects of standards in such a setting.
We consider a two country world in which a domestic and a foreign firm choose whether
or not to do R&D to develop a new product A. R&D is risky because the date of discovery is
stochastic, and because winning the patent for A does not prevent the development of a close, but
imperfect, substitute for A. That is, winning the patent for A does not guarantee monopoly in the
standard sense because there are many close, but imperfect, substitutes for A which are different
from the view of patent law. This precludes either firm from attempting to develop all products,
simultaneously or sequentially, in order to preempt or exclude the other firm from the market (see
Gilben and Newbery (1982) for a thorough discussion of this possibility). Thus, we simply
assume each firm can also do R&D to develop one of the products which are substitutes for A. We
label this product B, and we assume A is superior to B in that each firm would prefer to win the
pat~nt for A.
Formally, we consider the following continuous time game. At each point in time (date)
before either A or B is discovered, each firm can either do R&D on A, do R&D onB, or do
nothing. If a firm succeeds in developing A or B first, then the game essentially ends for that firm.
At each date thereafter, it produces the product it discovered. The remaining firm can then either
do R&D on the undiscovered product or do nothing at each date after this first discovery date. If
this finn succeeds in developing the other product, then it produces that product at each date
2
thereafter. To formalize our assumptions on A and B, let 7rj (A) = I. 7r7(A), i=1,2, be the total
m=!
flow profit earned by firm i if it has discovered A but B has not been discovered, where 7r 7is
2
firm i's flow profit from country m. Let 7rj (A;B) = I. 7r7 (A;B) be the flow profit earned by
m=!
firm i if it has discovered A and B has been discovered. Define 7rj (B) and 7rj (B;A) analogously.
Then 7r ':' (A) > 7r ':' (A;B) and 7r ':' (B) > 7r m (B;A) embody the notion that A and B are substitutes,
1 1 1 1 .
7and 7r m (A) > 7r m (B) and 7r m (A;B) > 7r m (B;A) imply A is superior to B in each market. Thus,
1 1 1 1
we assume for m = 1,2 that
(AJ)
which guarantees the expected return from discovering A is greater than that from discovering B
when the R&D costs of A and B are the same. Also note this does not assume A is superior
enough to B in production that 7r 7(A;B) > 7r 7(B). That is, having a monopoly with B in each
market may provide greater profit than producing A when B is available. This profit ranking can
hold with a variety of differentiated product models, including Shaked and Sutton's (1982)
vertically differentiated demand structure and models with network externalities and variety (Farrell
and Saloner (1986b)). We demonstrate this for the Shaked and Sutton case in Appendix 2.
The discovery date of each new product is assumed to be stochastic and exponentially
distributed with parameter Il, so that if either firm does R&D, the probability it will discover the
new product between times t and t + dt is Ildt. Firms incur a constant flow cost of development,
and these costs may differ by firm as well as the product being developed. Firm i must pay a
con~tant flow cost~ > 0 to do R&D on A or a constant flow cost kiB > 0 to do R&D on B
(i = 1,2). Then frrm i has an advantage relative to firm j in developing A if kiA < kjA j:;ti. Under
(AI) and our specification of R&D, this is the most tractable way to represent one firm as having
an advantage in the race. As will be clear from Theorem 1, the asymmetry in frrm costs is
necessary for the existence of a unique equilibrium in which the domestic and foreign frrm conduct
R&D on different products. The asymmetry in the cost to develop each product seems natural for
vertically differentiated products. Moreover, given (AI), B would never be the first product
developed if~ = krn, for i = 1, 2. Also note, this modeling choice is not crucial because the
analysis can be generalized to hazard rates that differ among frrms or innovations, or that depend
on accumulated R&D experience, as in FGST (1983) and Lippman and McCardle (1988).
Because we are interested in the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), we must construct
payoffs which incorporate optimal behavior by the remaining fIrm after its rival has discovered A
8or B. Suppose that firm i discovers A first. If firm j (j = 1,2 j :;ti) does R&D on B at every date
I
until it succeeds, then it pays the flow cost kjB until B is discovered and earns the flow profit
1'tj (B;A) thereafter. Hence, the expected return from R&D on B at every date until discovery,
discounted back to the discovery date of A is
SjB = [(u/r)1rj (B;A)-kjB]/(r+.u)
where SjB is used to denote the fact that B is the second product discovered (by j) and r is the
common discount rate. Note that the assumption
(1)
(A2) (~/r)1't:(B;A)> kjB for j,m =1,2
guarantees that, given A has been discovered, firm j's optimal strategy is to do R&D on B at every
date thereafter until it succeeds.
Similarly, firm i earns 1r; (A) in each period after A is discovered, but before B is
discovered, and 1r; (A;B) in each period after B is discovered. Hence, firm i's expected return
from A, discounted back to its discovery date, is
FiA = [1r; (A) + (~/ r) 1r; (A;B)] / (r + ~).
The .notation FiA denotes that A is the first product discovered (by i).
Now suppose firm i discovers B first. If firm j does R&D on A at every date until it




(A3) (.u/r)1r: (A;B) > kjAfor j,m = 1,2
guarantees that, given B has been discovered, finn j's optimal strategy is to do R&D on A at every
date thereafter until it succeeds. In the absence of standards, (A2) and (A3) are stronger than is
necessary to ensure that the expected return to R&D on each good is positive, even when the other
product is available. We prefer to make these strong assumptions, however, because they ensure a
positive expected return to R&D on both products even when market access is denied by a standard
in one market. As noted above, (AI) implies SjA > SJ"B if kjB = kjA (superiority of A in production
9implies its superiority in development if the flow costs are the same). Finn i's expected return
from B, discounted back to its discovery date, is
(4)
Notice (AI) also implies FiA > FiB' More importantly, there is an incentive for a fInn at a
disadvantage in a race for A to begin trying to develop B immediately, rather than race for A and
develop B if it loses the race. If it discovers B fust, it earns monopoly profit Jri (B) until A is
discovered.
Now consider the game before A or B has been discovered (which is assumed to begin at
t=O). Let a denote the strategy of doing R&D on A at every date until its discovery by either firm,
and then continuing optimally (as noted above). Similarly, let b denote the strategy of doing R&D
on B at every date until its discovery by either firm, and then continuing optimally. Let d denote
delaying, the strategy of doing nothing at every date until either product is discovered by the other
finn, and then continuing optimally. The memorylessness property of the exponential distribution
and the assumption of a constant hazard rate allows the payoffs from these strategies to be written
simply in reduced form. Table I gives the expected payoffs to firm 1 for all possible choices of
these strategies by itself and fum 2. The payoffs to firm 2 are omitted because they are defined
analogously.
It is easy to see from these payoffs that delaying R&D cannot be an equilibrium in this
mode1.6 This is because (A2) and (A3) ensure that a fum's expected return to doing R&D on either
A or B is greater than the return to delaying, regardless of its rival's strategy. As long as
discovering either product has a positive expected return, then it is surely better for a fum to begin
R&D immediately because there is a chance it will discover its product first. Therefore the only
question is whether a finn conducts R&D on A or B. From Table 1, one can see that IJ.(FIA - FIB)
6Delaying can be an equilibrium in certain policy scenarios, such as that considered in
Section 5. It can also be an equilibrium when there are spillovers or if imitation is possible. It is
also possible for (a,b) to be an equilibrium with spillovers (or imitation) because a fum earns
monopoly profits for some period if it discovers its product first. Results for the race with
spillovers are available from the authors.
10
> k lA - k IB implies that fInn 1 will do R&D on A regardless of fInn 2's strategy. This condition
simply says that fInn 1's expected flow return from being fIrst to discover A, net of the flow cost
of R&D, is greater than that from being fIrst to discover B. Conversely, if !J.CFIA - FIB) <
klA - k lB, then fInn 1's expected flow return from being first to discover B (net of the flow cost of
R&D) exceeds that from A, and fInn 1 will do R&D on B regardless of fInn 2's strategy.
.
Analogous arguments apply to fInn 2, so that the results of Theorem 1 follow immediately.
Formal proofs of this theorem and all remaining ones in the paper, are given in Appendix 1.
TheQrem ]. Under (A1)-(A3), the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is:
(i) (a,a) if and only if kiA - kiB < J1(FiA - FiB) for i =1,2.
(ii) (a,b) ifand only ifboth k1A - k1B < J1(F1A - F1B) and k2A - k2B > J1(F2A - F2B).
(iii) (b,a) ifand only if both k1A - k1B > J1(F1A - F1B) and k2A - k2B < J1(F2A - F2B).
(iv) (b,b) ifand only if k iA - kiB > J1(FiA - F;B) for i =12.
Figure 1 is a convenient way to describe the results in Theorem 1. The lines
Il(FIA - FIB) =k lA - k lB and IlCF2A - Fm) =k2A - km divide the space into four quadrants, where
eq~libriaare as indicated. These lines intersect at I, where k iA - kill> 0 for both i, because (AI)
implies that it is better to be fIrst to develop A than B, FiA > FiB. Notice that the equilibrium of this
game is unique for all values of parameters such that~ - kiB :¢: Il(FiA - FiB) for both i = 1,2. The
reason for this is that a is finn i's strongly dominant strategy if and only if kiA - kiB < Il(FiA - FiB),
and b is fInn i's strongly dominant strategy if and only if kiA - kiB > J.1.(FiA ~ FiB)'
If, however, ~- k;a= IlCFiA - FiB) for either or both fInns, then there are multiple SPE.
For example, if k lA - k lB = Il(FIA - FIB) and k2A - km > 1l(F2A - F2B), then (a,b) is still an SPE,
but there is a continuum of other SPE. One of these is firm 2 does R&D on B at every date until its
discovery, but fInn 1 switches between R&D on A and R&D on B at every date until one of them
is discovered. Although this type of result is interesting, in general, we do not dwell upon this
possibility. The focus of our analysis is on the outcome where, absent policy, the firms would
simultaneously develop different products.
•11
As is clear from Figure 1, whether or not one fIrm has an advantage over the other in
developing a product depends on the flow costs of R&D. The easiest way to see this is to observe
that, if flow R&D costs are the same for both firms and products, then k1A - k lB = k2A - k2B =O.
The corresponding point in the figure is the origin, and (a,a) is the unique SPE. However, if fInn
1 is given a large enough advantage in developing A (by increasing k2A enough), then the point
(k1A - k lB, k2A - k2B) in the figure moves upward along the k2A - km axis until (a,b) is the unique
SPE. The latter equilibrium is the most interesting one for our purposes. Not only is it consistent
with the observation that finns often race to develop imperfect substitutes, but also it allows us to
examine the impact of product standards announced before products are developed.
3. R&D Under a National Standard
In this section, we examine R&D decisions in the presence of a national standard in one
country. We defIne a standard set by country ril's government as a product specification that must
be met in order for the product to be sold in country m, m=1,2. If, for example, B is set as a
standard in country m, any product sold by either firm in that market must have the same
characteristics as B. The only way A can be sold in country m, is for an adapter to be developed
so that A meets the same specification as B. In reality, standards may be specified in terms of
single characteristics (such as band width), or governments may announce the product developed
by a domesticfmn "as the standard." The former is consistent with FCC policy in 1988, and the
latter was characteristic of European standard setting with color TV. Our defInition of a standard
can be consistent with both examples and is a simple way of introducing standards to the analysis.
In this setting, a standard in country m creates monopoly power in the m's market for the
,
firm that develops the product chosen as the standard. Since this reduces the expected return to
either fIrm from developing the other product, both fIrms are more likely to develop the product
chosen as the standard. Formally, let the superscript p = a, b denote a variable when there is a
standard in country m. Suppose A is the standard. Because B cannot be sold in m, fIrm i's flow
profit from selling B comes entirely from sales in the other country, n. That is,
12
n~(B) = nn(B) < n. (B) for i = 1,2 and n *" m before the successful completion of the rival's, , ,
R&D and n"(B;A) = nn(B;A) < n,(B;A) once A has been developed. As long as country n's, ,
government is inactive, 1C a (A) = n; (A) because A can be sold in each market. The flow profit
I
from A when B is available increases under this policy because the firm selling A in country m
earns monopoly profit in that market. That is, n" (A;B) =n~(A;B) + nm(A) > n,. (A;B). This, , ,
implies F ~ > F iA and F ~ < F ill for both finns. Although it also implies S~ > S iA and S~ < Sill'
(A2) and (A3) are sufficient for both goods to be developed. The impact of B as a standard in
country m is analogous.





k 2A - k 2B' where M is a positive number large enough to bound /1 (F iA - F ill) and /1 (F~ - F ;) in
absolute value for i = 1,2 and p =a,b. Then the imposition ofa national standard by either
government increases the likelihood that both firms race to develop the product chosen as the
standard (i.e., increases the area ofthe set ofparameters for which the firms racing is the unique
SPE).
To consider the implications of Theorem 2 for strategic standard setting, assume firms I
and 2 are owned by residents of countries 1 and 2, respectively, and that finn l's advantage in
developing A is large enough that (a,b) is the unique SPE in the absence of policy. Since firm 2 is
the "laggard," the policy of interest is an ex ante commitment by country 2's government to B as a
standard. With this policy, the government ensures monopoly profits at home for the domestic
finn if it is first to develop its product. While this increases the domestic finn's expected return
from developing B, it does so for the foreign finn as well. Thus, as shown in Figure 2a, the lines
denoting equality of expected relative returns and relative R&D costs shift toward the axes. The
area to the nonheast of l' represents parameter values for which (b, b) is the unique equilibrium
with the standard. This area is clearly larger than the area nonheast of I, which represents.
parameter values for which (b, b) is the unique equilibrium without policy.
Thus with uncertain R&D, ex ante commitment to B as a standard may not benefit the
domestic firm. The foreign firm is the beneficiary, ex post, if the standard induces finn 1 to
13
conduct R&D on B and finn 1 wins the race. Of course, if fInn 2 wins the race or if (a. b) remains
the equilibrium, the domestic firm benefIts ex post. If, for example, G represents relative flow
costs, neither fIrm's equilibrium strategy is altered and the standard acts as a prohibitive quota once
both products are developed.?
These effects are in sharp contrast to those of an R&D subsidy designed to improve fInn
2's position. Since fInn 2's disadvantage is a flow cost for developing A that is higher than fInn
1's, the subsidy that reduces (or potentially eliminates) its disadvantage is a constant for each date
the fInn does R&D on A. Let~ represent this subsidy. With the subsidy,fmn 2's equilibrium
strategy depends on 11 (F2A - F 2B) relative to k 2A - Z2A - k 2B • It is then straightforward to show
that the subsidy increases the likelihood of a unique equilibrium in which fmn 2 attempts to
develop A. Finn 1's strategy is unaffected since its expected profit is the same as with no policy.
Thus the subsidy shifts only the horizontal reference line in Figure 2b. When ~ is available to
fmn 2, (a, b) is the unique equilibrium for parameter values to the northwest of I", and (b, b) is the
unique equilibrium to the northeast of I". This area is clearly smaller than the area north of I.8
Thus, while the subsidy and standard are both designed to benefIt fmn 2, their effects are
quite different. In part, this is because the subsidy is fInn specifIc, and the standard is market
specific, altering both fmns' incentives. In addition, the standard and subsidy analyzed here alter
fmn 2's incentives in opposite directions. B as a standard reinforces the domestic finn's decision
in the absence of a standard, a decision directly related to the cost disadvantage. By reducing the
cost disadvanta~e, the subsidy reduces frrm 2's incentive to develop B. Finally, the subsidy has
no effect on market access, while the standard acts as a prohibitive quota, ensuring a monopoly
market for the fInn that wins the race for B. This, of course, raises questions as to consumer
7It is straightforward to show that the probability any point G, to the northwest of I, is also to the
northwest of 1', decreases with the size of country 2's market and the hazard rate. In the case of
HDTV and the FCC regulation, some analysts predicted the Japanese would not find it worthwhile
to modify their development strategy.
8If, however, the R&D programs are subsidized equally (i.e., Zv. = z.w), neither reference line
shifts and the equilibrium outcomes are the same as in the game with no policy. If .only R&D on B
is subsidized, the set of parameter values for which (a, b) and (b, b) is the unique equilibrium is
larger with the subsidy.
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effects of the standard. In the next section, we show that the quota-like characteristic of a standard
can be problematic, even when network benefits of the standard are imponant.
Before proceeding, note that Theorem 2 implies A as a standard affects finn 2's incentives
in the same direction as~. Thus A is the standard that offsets firm 2's disadvantage. This type
of policy is uncommon, however, because it involves an ex ante commitment by country 2's
government to the product being developed by the foreign fmn.9 Note also that our analysis
presumes an adapter cannot be developed to bring A in line with the standard. If an adapter could
be developed, which would not increase A's production cost, then the standard would have no
effect. If an adapter could be developed, but was costly to produce, then the standard would have
the same qualitative effects as it does in Theorem 2.
4. Welfare Effects of B as a Standard
A major concern with standards set for strategic reasons is their impact on consumers, and
hence aggregate welfare. This is a natural concern for the type of race we consider, not only
because a standard limits market access, but also because an inferior product may be chosen if the
standard is set to benefit the lagging finn. "Lock in" to an inferior technology (or product) is a
well known problem with de facto standardization with network effects and with de jure
standardization in dynamic models with private information and learning. IO Here we show that
de jure standardization can be problematic even if the only uncertainty is the arrival dates of
products and with or without significant network effects.
In this section we examine the welfare effects of an ex ante commitment by country 2's
government to B as a standard. Whether the standard increases welfare in country 2 throughout
the race is shown to depend on consumer surplus effects, as well as the order in which products
are discovered. We show that even if the standard increases welfare at the end of the game, it can
9An exception is post World War II Japanese policy in machine tools, which involved support of
domestic firms if they produced according to foreign standards. .
IOFor examples, see David and Greenstein (1990), Lehr (1994), and Choi (1993).
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be time inconsistent in the sense that expected welfare at the beginning of the game may not
increase. That is, in a game where the government moves first, applying a standard unifonnly
throughout the game would not be a subgame perfect equilibrium.
For simplicity, we assume parameter values are such that Ca, b) is the unique equilibrium
with and without the standard; that is,
k lA - klB < pCF1: - F l~) and k ZA - k 2B > p(FZA - F 2B ). (5)
In this case, firm 2 clearly benefits from the standard once both A and B are discovered, so that
whether or not country 2's welfare increases depends on consumer surplus effects. Neither this
assumption, nor our focus on B as the standard, is critical since the time consistency problem we
examine also occurs if (b, b) is the unique equilibrium with B as the standard or if A is the standard
imposed in country 2.
There are three times at which it is natural to compare welfare; the beginning of the game
(t =0); the first discovery date; and the second discovery date (i.e., when both have been
discovered). Suppose firm 1 succeeds first. Then in the absence of policy, expected welfare,
discounted back to the discovery date of A, in each country is
W1(F1A )= {Jr1(A)+C1(A)+(P/r)[Jr1(A;B)+C1(A,B)]}/(r+p) and (6)
W 2(SZB) ={Cz(A)+(P I r)[Jrz(B;A)+Cz(A,B)]- k 2B } I (r + p) (7)
where flow consumer surplus in country i is Cj(A) if only A is available and Cj(A,B) if both A and
B are available. Similarly, if firm 2 succeeds first, then expected welfare, discounted back to the
discovery date of B, in each country is
W 1(SIA) = {C1(B) + (Jl. I r)[ Jr1 (A;B) + C1(A,B)] - k1A } I (r + 11) and (8)
WiF2B ) = {Jr2(B) + Cz(B) + (Jl. I r) [ Jr2(B;A) + C2(A,B)] 1I (r + Jl.) (9)
where Ci(B) is flow consumer surplus if only B is available. Initial expected welfare (at
t = 0) is defined analogously to the expected finn payoffs; that is,
W1(a,b) = [Jl.W1(FIA) + Jl.W1(SlA) - k1A)] I (r + 2Jl.) and




Expressions for expected welfare under the standard are defmed analogously to (6)-(11) with 7r ~
(e) and C~(e) replacing 1Cj (e) and Ci(e).
Under our assumptions it is clear that the standard reduces welfare in country 1 at all three
dates because it decreases firm l's profit, and consumers are either unaffected or their welfare
declines in the presence of network effects. However, the effect of the standard on country 2's
welfare is ambiguous. Firm 2 must gain after both A and B are discovered, of course, because it
has a monopoly in its own market, 1C b(B;A) > 1CiB;A). Whether consumers gain or lose after
2
both A and B are discovered depends on the magnitude of the benefits from network externalities,
if any. Without network effects, domestic monopoly provision of B implies consumers must lose,
Cb(A,B) = Cb(B) = C2(B) < C2(A,B). But with network effects, consumers may well prefer2 2
monopoly provision of B to duopoly provision of A and B, C2(B) > C2(A,B). Thus we have two
cases to consider. In the fIrst, monopoly effects dominate any network benefits,
(A4)
so flow welfare increases after both A and B are discovered only if finn 2's gain exceeds
con~umers' losses, 7r b (B;A) -1C2(B;A) > C2(A,B) - C2(B). In the second, network benefits2
dominate,
(AS)
so flow welfare must increase, 1C b(B;A) + Cz{B) > 1C2(B;A) + Cz(A,B).2
Even if the standard increases flow welfare after both A and B are discovered, however, it
need not increase expected welfare either at the beginning of the game or at the first discovery date.
IfA is discovered first, then consumers lose between the discovery dates of A and B because the
standard acts as a prohibitive quota on A, C b(A) =0 < C2(A). Under both (A4) and (A5), it is2
this interim loss to consumers that leads to time consistency problems with the standard. Theorem
3 describes when B as a standard is time-consistent or not.
Theorem 3: Assume (5) holds. If the standard reduces country 2's flow welfare after both
A and B are discovered, it also reduces both initial expected welfare and expected welfare at the
first discovery date whether A or B is discoveredfirst.
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If the standard increases flow welfare after both A and B are discovered, it will also
increase both initial expected welfare and expected welfare at the first discovery date (f .
(i) Cz(A) < (.u / r) [n~(B)- n;(B;A)+ Cz(B)- Cz(A,B)]. If, however,
(ii) 0 < (.u / r) [n~(B)- n~(B;A)+ Cz(B)- Cz(A,B)]::; Cz(A) the standard can be time
inconsistent in three ways:
(iii) It can increase initial expected welfare, decrease expected welfare at the first discovery date
zfA is discovered first, and then increase flow welfare after B is also discovered.
(iv) It can decrease initial expected welfare, decrease expected welfare at the first discovery
date ifA is discovered first, and increase flow welfare after B is also discovered.
(v) Finally, it can dec!ease initial expected welfare, increase expected welfare at the first
discovery date ifB is discovered first, and then increase flow welfare after A is also
discovered.
If the standard reduces welfare in country 2 after A and B are discovered,
n b(B;A) + Cz{B) < n2(B;A) + ~(A,B), then expected welfare at the first discovery date is alsoz
lower whether A or B is discovered first, Wz(F b ) < W z(F2B) and Wz(S b ) < W z(S2B)' Therefore
. 2B 2B
initIal expected welfare is lower under this standard, W b (a,b) < Wz(a,b). If instead, the standard
z
increases flow welfare in country 2 after both A and B are discovered, the right hand side of (i) in
Theorem 3 is positive. Notice 'the right hand side of (i) is always positive under (AS), and it is
positive under (A4) if the gain to fInn 2 outweighs the loss to consumers. In either case, if B is
discovered first, this positive tenn represents the only effect of the standard. If, however, A is
discovered first, some consumers lose because they cannot consume A in the interim (even if they
are stranded once B is discovered). This interim loss is represented by the left hand side of (i). If
this loss is small enough for (i) to hold, the standard is time consistent. If, however, (ii) holds, the
standard can increase or decrease expected welfare at the fIrst discovery date when A is discovered
fIrst, and so increase or decrease intitial expected welfare even though flow welfare increases at the
end of the game. The intuition is simply that the standard huns consumers after A is discovered,
but helps finn 2 only after both products are discovered. If B is discovered fIrst, then the only
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effect occurs after both have been discovered, when welfare is higher with the standard.
Consumers' expected loss between the discovery times of A and B may be large enough to
outweigh the flow welfare increase after B is discovered,which gives rise to cases (iii) - (v) above.
The results in Theorem 3 are based on the assumption that (a, b) is the unique equilibrium
with or without B as a standard. To see that this assumption is not critical, suppose (b, b)
becomes the unique equilibrium with B as the standard in country 2. If fIrm 2 wins the race for B,
then fIrm 1's only recourse is to develop A, and the welfare effects are exactly the same as those
when (a,b) is the SPE and fInn 2 discovers B fIrst. That is, the standard is time consistent under
condition (i) in Theorem 3. If fIrm 1 wins the race for B, however, then it is easy to see that the
standard is not time consistent after fInn 2 discovers A. When monopoly effects dominate, (A4),
one would expect country 2's government to drop the standard because it reduces both consumer
surplus and profit, Cz(B) < Cz(A,B) and 1C b (A;B) < 1rz(A;B). When network effects dominate,z
(A5), one would expect counny 2's government to switch and set A as the standard because this
increases consumer surplus and finn 2's profit, Cz(A) > Cz(B) and n I (A;B) + n z (A) >z z
Similar problems arise if A is the standard. As is clear from Theorem 2, (a,a) is more
likely to be the unique equilibrium in this case. With uncertain R&D it is not clear that fInn 2 will
win the race or that welfare will improve. Moreover, fIrm 2 may have enough of a disadvantage in
R&D on A that (a,b) remains the equilibrium, in which case firm 2 loses since it can't sell B in its
own market (without an adapter). With or without network effects, consumers lose between the
first and second discovery dates, if B is discovered fIrst, because they cannot consume the
product. As before, consumer effects,depend on the net effects of monopoly and networks.
•">
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5. Toward a Time-Consistent Standard
The results of Section 4 suggest that anticipatory standards can be problematic, regardless
of which standard is set. The results are driven by uncenain discovery and the fact that either
standard acts as a prohibitive quota once the foreign product is discovered. In this section, we
show that a contingent standard with a compulsory license clause can circumvent these problems.
We consider the following state-contingent policy: (i) A is the standard in country 2 if it is
discovered by fInn 2 or if fInn 1 discovers it and licenses the patent to fInn 2 at a fixed fee (set by
the government); (ii) B is set as a standard once it is discovered if fIrm 1 discovers A, but does not
license the patent. This policy satisfies the srrategic motive to improve firm 2's competitive
position in the race because it benefits fIrm 2 regardless of which product is discovered first.
Interestingly, however, it may induce fIrm 2 to exit the race if the potential gain from licensing is
high enough. As we show in this section, it also benefIts consumers in country 2 (relative to any
of the situations considered in Section 4) because of duopoly competition when licensing occurs.
For clarity we focus on the case where (a,b) is the unique SPE in the absence of policy and
if B js the standard. We prove the contingent policy outlined above is time consistent under (A5).
We prove it is also time-consistent under (A4) if the standard benefits finn 2 more than it hurts
consumers in country 2 once both products are discovered. I I Eliminating the case where
consumers lose more than fmn 2 gains under (A4) entails no loss of generality since B as a
standard is time consistent in that case. Time inconsistency arises in the other case because, even
though the standard increases flow welfare after both products are discovered, consumers in
country 2 lose after A is discovered, but fmn 2 gains only after B is discovered. Therefore, a time
consistent policy must have the propeny that both finn 2 and consumers in country 2 benefit from
it whichever product is discovered first.
llIfB as a standard reduces welfare after both products are discovered, it is not a credible
policy for country 2's government. This lack of credibility alters the expected returns to finns 1
and 2 so that licensing is unlikely to occur in equilibrium. Thus the benefits associated with
licensing under the contingent policy we consider would not occur.
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We shall refer to the game with B as a standard as the b game and to the game with A as a
contingent standard as the c game. Suppose A is discovered first by firm 1 in the c game. Then
firm 1 can either offer a license to fum 2 at fee L, in which case firm 2 can buy the license or not,





and fum 2's expected return is
(12)
(13)
where 1t.(A;A) is firm i's flow duopoly profits from selling A in both markets. If fum 1 does not
1
license the patent, then country 2's government will not enforce B as the standard until its discovery
because it is not credible to do so. Therefore, if firm 1 does not license, its expected return is
F I:=[7r1(A)+(,u!r)7r~(A;B)] / (r + ,u), and
fum 2's expected return is




(A6) (r / ,u) < [7r1 (A,A) - 7r~(A;B)] / [7r1(A) - 7r1 (A;A)]
is sufficient to guarantee that firm 1 will offer a license for any nonne1!ative fee (Le., Fe> F n for
~ . lA lA
any L ~ 0). Notice that in order for (A6) to hold, firm 1's profit from selling A in both markets
when it has licensed A must exceed its profit from its own market when A and B are both
available. In this case (A6) holds for a high enough hazard rate because increasing the hazard rate
speeds up the expected discovery date of B, and thus reduces the length of time fum 1 can earn
monopoly profit from A in both markets. The assumption
(A 7)
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is sufficient to guarantee that finn 2 will buy a license at a minimal positive fee (i.e., S 2: > S 2nb for
a sufficiently small but positive fee L). This condition simply says flow profit if it buys the license
exceeds flow profit under the standard when A is available. 12
Now suppose B is discovered first Then firm 2 produces B for sale in both counnies at
least until A is discovered. The outcome of the licensing game' now depends, in part, on whether
firm 2 can sell both A and B in country I when it buys a license for A. Because this would reduce
firm l's flow profit from its own market (compared to duopoly production of A in both countries),
it is reasonable to assume that finn I will not sell a license unless finn 2 agrees to stop selling B in
country 1. Hence, if finn 1 offers a license at fee L and finn 2 buys, then finn 1 earns [1t1(A;A)/r]
+ L and firm 2 earns [nzCA;A) / r] - L. Otherwise, B becomes the standard, so firm 1 earns
n~ (A;B) / r and firm 2 earns n~ (B;A) / r. Again, (A6) and (A7) are sufficient to ensure A is
licensed if it is discovered second by finn 1.
Theorem 4: Suppose country 2 's government adopts the contingent standard policy and A
is discovered by firm 1. Then, under (Al), (A2), (A3), (A6), and (A7); there exist values L}< 0
an4~> 0 such that the unique SPE of the licensing subgame induced by this policy isfirm 1
offers the license atfee L andfirm 2 buys the licensefor any LE(Lb~)'
The proof of Theorem 4 shows that country 2's government can choose a small, but
positive, license fee such that licensing occurs if A is discovered by finn 1. Thus, whether A is
discovered first or second, or by finn I or 2, it becomes the standard in country 2, ex post. As
was the case with A as an arbitrary standard, this means that (a,a) is more likely to be the
equilibrium in the c game than with no policy. Even though this contingent standard makes doing
12(A6) and (A7) are stronger than is necessary for licensing to occur. All that is necessary
is that F : > FIn , S c > S n , and (5) still holds. A natural sufficient condition (which is also
weaker tHan (A~ anJtA7)}1s that the present value of both firms' profits under licensing exceeds
the present value of both finns' expected profits without licensing,
[nl(A;A)+ nzCA;A)]/r> { nl(A) + (jl/r)[ n~(A;B)+ n~(B;A)]} /(r+jl).
We make the stronger assumptions because they guarantee the contingent standard is time
consistent under natural rankings of consumer surplus.
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R&D on B less attractive, it is still possible that (a,b) will be the equilibrium. Notice, however,
that now there is an incentive for firm 2 to drop out of the race and wait to acquire a license for A.
Dropping out has the advantage of eliminating the uncenain flow costs of developing B, but also
has the disadvantage of eliminating the possibility of earning monopoly profit with B.
Theorem 5: Under (Al), (A2), (A3), (A6), and (A7), if(5) holds and k2A - k2B :>
J.1(F 2~A - F 2~B)' then the unique SPEfor all LE(LI1L2) is:
(i) (a,b) ifk2B < j.1niB) / (r + J.1).
(ii) (a,d) ifk2B > j.1niB) / (r + J.1).
In the c game, firm l's advantage in developing A does not ensure that firm 2 will develop
B in equilibrium, as it did in the b game and in the absence of policy. Firm 2 will deviate from this
outcome, to wait to license the patent for A, if the flow cost of doing R&D to discover B is greater
than discounted expected monopoly profit with B. Several remarks about this are in order. First,
. it is possible that only A may be discovered under this policy even though both products would be
discovered with no policy and with B as the standard. B never is discovered if A is discovered
first. This must occur if firm 2 delays in equilibrium, but it can also occur if firm 2 tries to develop
B. Second, if firm 2 does delay, then it is obviously giving up the chance of discovering B first
and earning monopoly profit until discovery of A. Hence this indicates that delaying is more likely
to be an equilibrium the lower the expected return from discovering B first. That is, delaying is
more likely the smaller the flow profit from B and/or the larger the flow cost of discovering B.
Delaying is also more likely the higher the return from acquiring the license, or the larger the
duopoly profit from A and/or the smaller the license fee..Third, finn I is even willing to give a
license to finn 2 (i.e., L = 0) because this ensures firm l's product is adopted as a standard.
The remaining question of interest is whether the contingent policy is time consistent. The
following theorem shows that if B as a standard increases flow welfare at the end of the game, the
contingent standard policy is indeed time consistent.
Theorem 6 Assume the conditions ofTheorem 5. The contingent standard policy is lime-
consistent under (A4) if B as a standard improves flow welfare after discovery ofboth products
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and if CiA,A) c CiA), where CiA,A) is country 2's consumer surplus from duopoly production
ofA. The cOnlingent policy is time-consistent under (AS) if C2(A,A) > Cz{A,B).
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If B is discovered first, then in the period
before A is discovered flow welfare is the same with both policies as with no policy. Once A is
;
discovered, whether it is first or second, then the contingent standard results in licensing. After
this occurs, flow welfare is higher with the contingent standard than with B as a standard (which
by hypothesis is higher than with no policy). Firm 2's flow profit must be higher because
otherwise it would not buy a license. Consumers in country 2 are better off because consumer
surplus from duopoly production of A exceeds that from monopoly production of A, and therefore
that from monopoly production of B when(A4) holds. Hence, the contingent standard is time
consistent in the sense that it increases expected welfare, compared to that with no policy, at every
date.
6. Concluding Remarks
As is always the case, our results are qualified by the assumptions from which theyJare
derived. The strongest of these assumptions are that: the discovery dates of the products are
exponentially distributed with constant hazard rates, and this is the only uncertainty in the model;
the flow costs of R&D are constant; and the foreign government is inactive. The effects of relaxing
these assumptions on our results are, of course, open questions. Nevertheless, we believe our
results are robust enough to survive many of these generalizations.
The key elements in our analysis are that: absent policy, the firms develop products that are
different, but close substitutes; and the order of discovery of these products is uncertain. Under
this scenario, an ex ante comminnent to a single product as a standard will not, in general, be a
time consistent policy because there is always the possibility that the other product will be
discovered fIrst and consumers will lose in the interim.
Allowing nonconstant hazard rates that reflect experience in R&D or variable R&D effort
should not preclude simultaneous development of substitutes as a possible equilibrium outcome. If
c
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one fInn has a large enough advantage (in greater initial experience or lower marginal cost of R&D,
for example), then the other firm would surely develop an inferior substitute instead of dropping
out. This analysis would, of course, be more complicated, particularly because it is not clear that
the parameter space could be partitioned in terms of equilibrium outcomes as conveniently as in
Theorem 1. Nevertheless, for these parameters for which simultaneous development of substitutes
is an equilibrium, our basic policy results should remain intact.
A more interesting extension would be to introduce another type of uncertainty. For
example, a referee has suggested inn-oducing the option of developing a third product, which is
superior to the others (such as digital HDTV), in such a way as to examine the possibility of
second mover advantages. This would be interesting, and naturally would expand the set of
possible equilibrium outcomes. However, it seems clear that our results regarding the time
consistency of policy would still obtain as long as some pair of different products are developed
and the order of discovery is uncertain.
Finally, the assumption that the foreign government is inactive seems unduly restrictive.
Ind~ed, allowing this government to choose standards policies could alter the equilibrium outcome
of the R&D game, but we cannot see how it would change our major policy results. Given the
uncertain order of discovery, a policy employing standards will not, in general, be time consistent
unless it is designed to depend at least upon the order of discovery (i.e., is state'-contingent). In a
game in which governments choose policies optimally, we would naturally expect results to
depend on the order of government moves as well. While we might expect a Prisoner's Dilemma
outcome, it is diffIcult to predict since such a game is much more complex than the one we
consider and beyond the scope of this paper.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Theorem 1. From Table 1:
PI (a,a) - PI (b,a) = PI(a,b):"" PI (b,b) = [1l(FIA - FIB) - (kiA - kIB)] / (r + 21l) and
PI(a,d) - PI (b,d) = [1l(FIA - FIB) - (kiA - kIB)] / (r + Il).
From the analogous payoffs for fum 2,
P2(a,a) - P2(a,b) =P2(b,a) - P2(b,b) = [Il (F2A - F2B) - (k2A - k2B)] / (r + 21l) and
Pid,a) - P2(d,b) = [1l(F2A- F2B) - (k2A -k2B)] / (r + Il).
Funher note that (AI) - (A3) imply PI(a,b) > PI(d,b), PI(a,d) > PI(d,d),
P l (b,a) > PI(d,a), PI(b,d) > PI(d,d), P2(b,a) > P2(b,d), P2(d,a) > P2(d,d), Pia,b) > P2(a,d), and
P2(d,b) > P2(d,d).
Assume Il(FIA - FIB) > k lA - k iB . Then PI (a,s2) > PI(b,S2) for all S2 E {a,b,d}. This plus
PI(b,a) > PI (d,a) implies PI (a,a) > PI(d,a), and so PI(a,s2) >PI(d,s2) for all ~E {a,b,d}.
Similarly, if Il(FIA - FIB) < k lA - k lB , then PI(b,S2) > PI(a,s2) for all S2 E {a,b,d}. This plus
Pl(~,b) > Pt(d,b) implies Pt(b,b) > Pt(d,b), and so PI(b,S2) > P t(d,s2) for all ~ E {a,b,d}.
Analogously, we havePisJ,a) > P2(sJ,b) and P2(sJ,a) > P2(sl,d) for all Sl E {a,b,d} if
1l(F2A- F2B ) > k2A - k2B , but P2(st,b) > P2(sJ,a) and P2(SI,b) > P2(st,d) for all ~ E {a,b,d} if
1l(F2A - F2B ) <~ - k2B • This proves the result when the fIrms are restricted to the stationary
strategies a,b,
andd.
Given the memorylessness propeny of the exponential distribution and the fact that hazard
rates are constant, this is suffIcient to prove the result in general. To see this, assume Il(FIA - FIB)
> k lA - k tB and Il (F2A - F2B) < k2A - k 2B , so PI(a,s2) > PI(b,S2) and PI (a,s2) > P I(d,s2) for all
S2 E {a,b,d}, and P2(sJ,b) > P2(Sha) and P2(sJ,b) > P2(SI,d) for all SI E {a,b,d}. We fIrst show
that fIrm l's payoff decreases if it deviates from a to any nonstationary strategy. We then show
that fInn 1's best reply remains a whenever fIrm 2 deviates "off the equilibriumpath."
Suppose finn 1 deviates from a by doing R&D on B for a length of time ~ at any date T
before the first discovery date. The payoff from this is
J~ e-rt (J.l.F1A + J.l.SIA - k 1A) e-2f..l.t dt + J~+t. e-rt (J.l.F1B + J.l.SIA - k lB ) e-2f..l.t dt
+ J; e-rt (J.l.FIA + J.l.SIA - k 1A) e-2f..l.t dt
= [1 - e -(r+2)l)T +e -(r+2f..l.) (f+~)] [ (!lFIA + J.l.SIA - k1A) / (r + 2J.l.)]
+ [e -(r+2f..l.)T -e-(r+2j.L) (f+~)] [(J.l.FIB + J.l.SIA- k 1A) / (r + 2J.l.)]
= [1- e -(r+2f..l.)T +e -(r+2f..l.) (f+M] PI (a,b) + [e -(r+2f..l.)T -e-(r+2j.L) (T+M] PI(b,b) <P1(a,b)
because P1(a,b) > P1(b,b).
The same decrease in payoff occurs for any number of deviations. For example, suppose
finn 1 alternates between A and B for intervals of length~. That is, finn 1 does R&D on A from 0
to ~, on B from ~ to 2~, on A from 2~ to 3~, on B from 3~ to 4~, and so on. The payoff from
this strategy is
L;= 0 [e-(r+2f..l.) (2n)~ _e-(r+2f..l.) (2n+l)~] P1(a,b)
+ L;;= 0 [e-(r+2f..l.) (2n+l)~ -e-(r+2f..l.) (2n+2)6] P1(b,b) < PI(a,b) because P1(a,b) > PI(b,b).
_ The same result obtains even if finn 1 alternates between R&D on A and R&D on B at every
instant of time. Taking limits from above as ~~O shows the payoff from this strategy is
(3/z)Pl(a,b) + (3/z)P1(b,b) < P1(a,b) as P1(a,b) >P1(b,b). Similarly, a deviation to doing nothing
from T to T+L\ reduces finn l's payoff because P1(a,b) >P1(d,b). Hence, a is fInn l's best reply
to b in general.
Now we show that a is tmn l's best reply if finn 2 deviates from b. Suppose fmn 2 deviates
from b by doing R&D on A for a length of time L\ at any date T before the first discovery date.
Then finn 1's payoff from a is
s~ e-rt (J.l.F1A + J.l.SIA - k lA) e-~f..l.t dt + S~+t. e-rt (J.l.FIA + J.l.SIB - k 1A) e-2)lt dt
+ S; e-rt (J.l.FIA + J.l.SIA - k 1A) e-2f..l.t dt
= [1 - e -(r+2f..l.)T +e -(r+2f..l.) (f+~)] PI(a,b) + [e -(r+2j.L)T -e-(r+2)l) (f+~)] P1(a,a)
Similarly, fmn 1's payoffs from b and dare
= [1- e -(r+2f..l.)T +e -(r+2j.L) (f+~)] PI(b,b) + [e -(r+2f..l.)T -e-(r+2)l) (f+~)] P1(b,a)
and
= [1- e -(r+21J.)T +e -(r+21J.) (T+~)J Pj(d,b) + [e -(r+21J.)T -e-(r+21J.) (T+~)J PI(d,a),
which are less than the payoff to a above because PI (a,s2) >PI(b,S2) and PI (a,s2) >PI(d,s~ for all
S2 E {a,b,d}.
Further, if fIrm 2 alternates between B and A for intervals of length 11 then fInn l's payoffs
from a, b, and d are, respectively,
L;= 0 [e-(r+21l) (2n)~ -e-(r+21l) (2n+l)~] PI(a,b)
+ ~ 00 [e-(r+21l) (2n+l)~ -e-(r+21l) (2n+2)~] P (a a)kn=O I , ,
L;= 0 [e-(r+:4!) (2n)~ -e-(r+21l) (2n+l)~] PI(b,b)
+ ~ 00 [e-(r+21l) (2n+l)~ -e-(r+21l) (2n+2)~] P (b a)kn=O I , ,
and
L;= 0 [e-(r+:4!) (2n)~ -e-(r+21l) (2n+l)~] PI(d,b)
+ L;= 0 [e-(r+21l) (2n+l)~ -e-(r+21l) (2n+2)~] PI(d,a).
Again, the payoff to a is greater than that to b and that to d because PI(a,s2) >PI(b,S2) and PI(a,s~
> P I (d,s2) for all S2E {a,b,d}. And for the same reason, the same results obtain iffmn 2 alternates
between B and A at every instant of time. Taking limits from above as 11~O shows the payoffs to
fIrm 1 from a, b, and d are Y2PI(a,b) + Y2PI(a,a), Y2PI(b,b) + Y2PI(b,a), and Y2PI(d,b) +
~PI(d,a). An analogous argument shows that a is fIrm l's best reply if firm 2 deviates to doing
nothing for some time or deviates to some combination of R&D on A or nothing. Hence, a
strongly dominates b and d for any deviation from b by Imn 2. Using the same technique as
above, one can easily show that, for any deviation from b by fmn 2, a still gives fmn 1 a greater
payoff than any nonstationary strategy in which fmn 1 does anything other than R&D on A for any
interval of time.
An argument analogous to the preceding shows that J.1.(F2A - F2B) < k2A - k2B implies b is
fmn 2's best reply to IIrnl 1's use of a, b, d, or any nonstationary strategy combining R&D on A,
R&D on B, or nothing.
Finally, assume that Jl(F2A - F2B ) < k2A - k2B but Jl(FIA - FIB) = klA - kiB . Then P1(a,s2) =
P 1(b,S2) for all S2E {a,b,d}, so there is a continuum of SPE. That is, from above, fIrm l's payoff
from a is not only the same as that from b, but also the same as that from alternating between R&D
on A and R&D on B. Analogously, there is a continuum of SPE in which fIrm 2 is "indifferent"
between R&D on A and R&D on B if Jl(FIA - FIB) > klA - klB but Jl(F2A - F2B) =
k2A - k2B • This completes the proof of (ii). The proofs of (i), (iii), and (iv) are entirely analogous.
Proof of Theorem 2. In the absence of a standard, both fIrms racing for A, (a, a), is the unique
SPE for all parameters in the set D=. {- M ;5; k - k < Jl(F - F ) and - M ;5; k - k <IA IB IA IB 2A 2B'
Jl(F - F )}, and both fInns racing for B, (b, b) is the unique SPE for all parameters in the set E2A 2B .
= {M ~ k - k > Jl(F - F ) and M ~ k - k > Jl(F - F )} .IA IB IA IB 2A 2B 2A 2B
IfA is imposed as a standard in country m, (a, a) is the unique SPE for all parameter values
in the set F= {- M;5; k lA - k lB < .u(F;A - F;B) and - M;5; k 2A - k2B < .u(F;A - F;B) }.
Because F~ - F~ > F iA - FiB for i = 1,2, the area ofF is larger than the area ofD. Hence, if all
p~eter values in S are equally likely, imposition of the standard increases the probability that
(a,a) is the unique SPE because [M + .u(F;A - F;B)][M + .u(F;A - F;B)] /4M 2 >
[M+.u(F1A -FIB )][M+.u(F2A -F2B )]/4M2 •
The proof for imposing B as a standard is analogous since F~ - F~ < F iA - FiB for i=1, 2
and (b, b) is the unique equilibrium for all parameters in the set G ={M ~ klA - k lB > .u(Fl~ - Fl~)
and M ~ k 2A - k2B > .u(F~A - F~B)} when B is the standard.
Proof of Theorem 3. IfW1( F 1:)' Wl(S~A)'W2(F 2~)' and W2(S2~) are the expressions for
expected welfare at the fIrst discovery date under the standard, then these are defIned by (6)-(9)
with 1r~ (e) and C ~ (e) replacing 1ri (e) and ~ (e). Similarly, let W~ (a,b) and W~ (a,b) be initial
expected welfare under the standard. Then these are defIned by (10) and (11) with WI(F1:),
W1(SI:)' W2(F 2~)' and W2(S2~ ) replacing W 1(FIA), W 1(SIA)' W2(F2B), and W2(S2B)' One can
show that W2(F2B) - WiF 2~) = (Jl /r)[ 1r2(B;A) - 1r ~(B;A) + ~(A,B)-
C~ (A,B)] I (r + Il) and W2(S2B) - Wi S2~) = {~(A) + (Il I r)[ 7r~(B;A) - 7r ~(B;A) + ~(A,B)­
C ~ (A,B)]} / (r + Il). After both A and B are discovered, country 2's flow welfare is 7r ~ (B;A) +
C ~ (A,B) with the standard and 7r2(B;A) + C2(A,B) without it, so it reduces flow welfare if and
only if 7r2(B;A) - 7r ~(B;A) + C2(A,B) - C~(A,B) > O. Hence, W2 (F2B) > W2(F z~) and
S b. bW z ( 2B) > W z (SZB)' whence Wz(a,b) > W z(a,b).
If flow welfare is higher with the standard after both are discovered, 1tz(B;A) - 1t ~ (B;A) +
Cz(A,B) - C~ (A,B) = 1ti (B;A) - ni(B) + Cz(A,B) - C2(B) < 0, then Wz(F z~» Wz(F2B)' Also
Wi S2bB) > Wz(S2B) if {C2(A) + (Il I r) [1tz(B;A) - 7r~ (B,A) - Cz(B) + Cz(A,B)]} I (r + Il) < O.
Hence, Cz (A) < (Il I r) [1t~(B) - 1t~ (B;A) + C2(B) - Cz(A;B)] implies W~(a,b) >
Wz (a,b). However, note that Cz(A) > 0 implies WiS2B) > W z( Sz~) can hold. Funher, because
W2(a,b) - W ~ (a,b) = Il[W2(F2B) - W2( F 2~) + WiS2B) - Wz( Sz~)] I (r + 21l), it is possible that
Wz(F 2~) > Wz(FZB), WZ(SZB) > W z( S2~)' and either W~(a,b) > Wia,b) or Wz(a,b) > W~(a,b).
Proof of Theorem 4. Firm 2's strongly dominant strategy is to buy a license if S~ > S2~ (when
A i~ discovered first) and [ 1tz(A;A) I r] - L > 1t ~ (B;A) I r (when B is discovered first). It is easily
shown that [ 1tz(A;A) I r] - L > 1t ~ (B;A) I r implies Sz~ > SznB. Hence, whether A is discovered
first or second, firm 2's strongly dominant strategy is to buy if [1tz(A;A) I r] - L > 1t~(B;A) I r, or
L < Lz = [1tz(A;A)- 7r~(B;A)] Ir,
where (AI) and (A7) imply Lz> O. Therefore, given any compulsory fee L < Lz, firm l's strongly
dominant strategy is to offer to sell a license at L if F 1: > F 1: (when A is discovered first) and
[ 1t1(A;A) I r] + L > 1t~ (A;B) I r (when B is discovered first). Because F 1: > F 1: implies
[1t1(A;A) I r] + L > 1C~ (A;B) I r, whether A is discovered first or second, fIrm 1's strongly
dominant strategy is to offer to sell for any L < Lz if F1: > F 1:' One can show that F 1: > F 1: if
and only if
,. b '
L > L1 = [{ 1t1(A) + (Il I r) 1t 1 (A;B)} I (r + Il)] - [1C1(A;A) I r], .
where (AI) and (A6) imply L 1 < O. Thus, whether A is discovered fIrst or second, the unique SPE
of this licensing game is fInn 1 offers to sell and firm 2 buys for all Le (L1,Lz).
Proof of Theorem 5. Under the contingent policy,
P:(a,a) - P:(b,a) = P:(a,b) -P:(b,b) = [F 1: - Fl~ - (k iA -k lB )] I (r + 2~),
P: (a,d) - P: (b,d) = [F1: ~ F I~ - (kiA - k 1B)] I (r + ~),
P;(a,a) - P;(a,b) = P;(b,a) - P;(b,b) = [F2: - F 2~ - (k2A - k 2B)] I (r + 2~), and
P;(d,a) - P;(d,b) = [F2: - F 2cB - (k2A - k2B)] I (r + Il).
Because F I: > F I: and F 1~ < F ~, it follows that k lA - k lB < Il( F I: - F 1~) implies
k lA - k lB < Il(F 1: - FI~)' Moreover, (AI), (A2), and (A3) imply P~(a,b) > P:(d,b),
P C(a,d) > PC(d,d), and pC(b,a) > P C(d,a). Hence, if (5) holds, then developing A is fIrm l's
1 1 1 1 .
strongly dominant strategy because p C(a,s2) > P C(b,S2) and P: (a,s2) > P C(d,s2) for S2E {a,b,d}.
1 1 1
Because k2A - k2B > Il( F 2: - F 2~) implies P; (a,b) > P; (a,a), the SPE must have fIrm I
developing A and fIrm 2 either developing B, delaying, or randomizing on these two pure
strategies. The result follows from the fact that pc (a,b) ~ pc (a,d) if and only if
2 < 2
Il 7t'2(B) I (r + Il) ~ k2B • Moreover, if 7t'(B) :5 (r + ~) 7t'1 (B;A) I Il, then k2B ~ Il 7t'2(B) I (r + ~) and< 2
(~) can hold simultaneously, so (ii) can occur.
Proof of Theorem 6 Under these assumptions, (a,b) is the unique SPE in the b game and the game
with no policy, while in the c game the unique SPE is (a,b) if k2B < Il 7t'lB) I (r + Il) and (a,d) if
k2B > Il 7t'iB) I (r + Il). First suppose k2B < Il 7t'2(B) I (r + Il). Then W; (a,b) - Wia,b) =
Il[W2(F 2~) - W2(F2B) + W2(S2~) - W2(S2B)] I (r + 2~). One can show W2(F~) > W2(F2B) if and
only ifL < LW , where
L W = [7t'2(A;A) - 7t'2(B;A) + ~(A,A) - C2(A,B)] I r.
Similarly, W2(S2~) > W2(S2B) if and only ifL < LWb, where
L wb = [7t'2(A;A) Ir] - [{(Il/r) 7t'2(B;A) - k2B }1 (r + Il)] +
[~(A,A.) Ir] - [{C2(A) + (Il Ir)C2(A,B)}1 (r + Jl)]'
One can show that (A4), n ~(B;A) + C~(A,B) > niB;A) + Cz(A,B), and Cz(A,A) ~ C2(A) imply
both L W > L2andLwb > Lz, so W2(F 2~) > W2(F2B), W 2(S2CB) > W2(S2B), and thus
W;(a,b) > W 2(a,b).
Now suppose k2B > j.l. n 2(B) / (r + j.l.) so W;(a,d) = j.l.W2(S2~) / (r + j.l.). One can show
W~(a,d)> Wz(a,b) if and only ifL < L Wd , where
L wd = [{ nz(A;A) + C2(A,A)} / r] - [{ nzCB) + C2(B) + 2(j.l. / r)[ nzCA;B) + Cz(A,B)]} / (r + 2j.l.)] +
[k2B / j.l.]. Under (A4), nP(B;A) + CP(A,B) > n 2(B;A) + Cz(A,B), C2(A,A) ~ C2(A), and k2B >2 2
j.l. n2(B) / (r + j.l.) imply Lwd > Lz, we have W C (a,d) > W2(a,b) also.
2
Under (AS) one can show L w > L2, Lwb > L z, and L wd > L2as long as C2(A,A) >
C2 (A,B). This is reasonable since A is considered superior to B.
Appendix 2
An example using the Shaked and Sutton qualitv differentiation structure
This section presents a concrete example to underscore the importance of the time
inconsistency problem and to demonstrate the superiority of a state contingent policy over a simple
standard. Consider a Shaked and Sutton vertical (quality) differentiation model where a consumer
has the following preferences:
if he buys product k with quality sA:; k =A, B.
if he buys nothing.
(), a positive real number, is a taste parameter uniformly distributed over the interval [.@, e ],
where .@ ~ 0 and e =.@ +1. Product A is superior to B, i.e., SA > SB>O. For simplicity, let
consumer tastes be identical across the two countries. Assume the fIrms simultaneously choose
quantities after developing their respective products and unit production costs are normalized to
zero.
First, in the absence of any policy, suppose fIrm i,i =1, 2; develops product k, k = A, B;
and the other product has not yet been discovered by the rival. Then, a consumer in country m, m
= 1,2; buys the product only if ()SA: - Plan ~ 0, i.e., demand for product k in country m is given by
Dtm(ptm)=hm{e-(PlanlsA:)} ; k=A,B; m=1,2. (2.1)
where hm is the number of consumers in country m.
Simple optimization yields i's maximum monopoly profIt in country mas
-2n~(k) = (hm () SA:) I 4
Hence, if fIrm 1 develops,A and fIrm 2 develops B, then aggregate profIts are
(2.2)
and (2.3)
Consumer surplus in country m when only product k is available is easily calculated as1
. -2
Cm(k) = (hm() SA:)/8 (2.4)
lConsumer surplus is computed using the formula Cm(k) = hm{I (lis, - P'ldll} , where 8=
PA: I SA: "
Now suppose both products have been discovered, i.e., fInn I has developed A and fInn 2
has discovered B. The consumer in country m who is indifferent between buying A and buying B
is characterized by the taste parameter 8 j where 81 = (PAm - PBm)/ (SA -SB)' The consumer who
is indifferent between buying B and between buying nothing has a taste parameter eo where
eo = PBm / SB' Product A is bought by all consumers with e E [ej , 'OJ and B is purchased by
consumers with e E [eo' ej J while all those consumers who have e E [~, eo J will buy neither
good. Hence, the demand functions for A and B are respectively given by
DAm (PAm' PBm) = hm('0 - 8j ) and (2.5)
Note that the market is assumed to be not covered since without this assumption the demand
functions cannot be invened and the Cournot equilibrium is not well defined.
Defme a = (2sA-SB) / (4sA-SB) and a = SA / (4sA-SB)' Then, the Nash equilibrium aggregate
profits when fInn 1 sells A and finn 2 sells B, in the absence of any standard, are given by
(2.6)
Consumer surplus in country m when both A and B are available is given by2
(2.7)
From the above relations, it may be verified that assumptions (AI) and (A4) are always satisfIed
Now, consider the policy game (b game) where country 2's government sets product Bas
the standard in its own country. Aggregate profIts in the b game can be derived in straightforward
fashion and we get
b -2 . b -2-2TIl (A) =(~e SA) / 4 and TIl (A;B) =~ a e SA (2.8)
TI~(B)=(~+~)('02SB)/4 and TI~(B;A)={~a2+;}'02SB (2.9)
The relevant expressions with respect to consumer surplus are given by
2Consumer surplus is calculated using the fonnula
{
B 81 }
em (A,B) = hm I(eSA- PA)de + I(eSB- PB)d8
Ct(A) =: c) (A) ; Ct(B) =C) (B) and
C;(A) = 0 ; C;(B) = C2 (B) and
C)b(A,B) =C) (A,B)
C; (A, B) = C2 (B)
(2.10)
(2.11)
These profit and consumer surplus expressions can now be used to compute welfare at
different dates and the following relations can be derived after some algebraic manipulations.
[
45 2_S 2+ S S ]Lemma: Define A= A B : B and recall that a = SA 1(4sA - SB)' Then,(4sA - SB)
(i) W2(F;B) ~ W2(F2B )
(ii) W;(a,b) ~ W2 (a,b)
(iii) W2(S;B) ~ W2(S2B)
if and only if
if and only if
if and only if
(3-8a2)SB~ 4SAA.
(3-8a2)sB~ 4SAA + 2~~f
3 8 2 > ') SA( - a )sB<: 4sA A + (7) .
In this example, the gain to firm 2 from B as a standard exceeds the loss to consumers if and
only if (3 - 8a2 )sB > 4sAA. However, the simple standard increases welfare at all dates only if
(3 - 8a2 )sB > 4sA A + S: . Otherwise, the policy may be time inconsistent as characterized in
(,). .
Theorem 3. For instance, with SA =5, SB =3.5, and J1 =10, we get
r
4sAA < (3 - 8a2)sB< 4sA A + S~ and from the Lemma, the simple standard decreases initial
. 2(,)
expected welfare, increases expected welfare at the first discovery date if B is discovered first, and
then increases flow welfare after A is also discovered.
We shall now show that the contingent standard, in contrast, improves welfare at all dates.
Consider the c game with licensing. If firm 1 discovers product A first and licenses it to firm 2
then both compete in t~e same product, yielding equilibrium profits and consumer surplus
-2
I1i (A;A) = (~ +~)() SA 19
-2Cm(A,A) =: (2hme SA) 19
(2.12)
(2.13)
Comparing (2.13) with (2.4), it is clear that Cm(A,A»Cm(A). Hence, from Theorem 6, the
contingent standard is welfare enhancing if assumptions (A6) and (A7) are satisfied (ensuring
licensing if A is discovered first) for the chosen parameter values. We can show that (A6) and
(A7) are equivalent to the following conditions, respectively.
1-[9~/(~+~)] a 2 > 5/[4(f)] (2.14)
(2.15)
These conditions are indeed satisfied for the parameters SA = 5, SB = 3.5, and !:.= 10, when, say,
r .
~ = 5, It;. = 3, fl.. = .1 and klA =k2B = 1,k1B = 6,ku = 45 . In sum, we have constructed an
example where the contingent policy enhances welfare at all dates even though the simple standard
policy is not time consistent.
Table 1
Payoffs to Firm 1
Pavoffs to finn 1 if finn 2's strategy is to do nothing until after discovery of A or B bv finn 1
Pl (a,d) = (/-lFIA - k1A) / (r + /-l)
Pl (b,d) = (/-lFlB - k lB) / (r + Jl)
P l (d,d) = 0
Payoffs to finn 1 if finn 2's strategy is to do R&D on B
Pl (a,b) = (/-lFIA + /-lSIA - k1A) / (r + 2Jl)
P1(b,b) = (/-lFlB + /-lSIA - k lB) / (r + 2/-l)
P1(d,b) = /-lSIA / (r + /-l)
Payoffs to finn 1 if finn 2's strategy is to do R&D on A
P1(a,a) = (I-lFIA + JlSlB - k 1A) / (r + 2/-l).
PI (b,a) = (/-lFlB + /-lSlB - k1B) / (r + 2/-l)
P1(d,a) = /-lSIB / (r + /-l)




1----------+---------- J.l(F2A - F2B ) =k 2A - k 2B
(a,a) (b,a)
Figure 1 k lA -k IB










Figure 2a k lA - k IB




Figure 2b klA - klB
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